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ABSTRACT 
The issue of whether firms design and develop products with modular product architectures 
that benefit from the efficiencies of using the market, or integrated product architectures 
that allow for leveraging firm capabilities is a central question within the product architecture 
literature. Empirical results show that product modularisation increases over time across a 
range of industries. However, evidence of increasing (re)integration at the product and 
industry level has also been hinted at in a limited set of studies. The fact that product 
architectures potentially oscillate between the modular and integrated designs, as well as 
often adopting a hybrid form, highlights the need for an integrated explanation concerning 
how and why this evolution occurs. On this basis we use draw upon the notions of synergistic 
specificity and product component complementarity. By considering the trade-offs between 
different types of value capture that are  possible in modular and integrated architectures we 
are able to build a basic explanation for the evolution of product architectures and their 
governance choices over the long-run. The proposed typology and discussion helps to 
synthesise existing evidence and provides the foundation for further empirical research. 
 
Keywords: product architecture; modularity; transaction costs; capabilities; 
complementarity.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Product architectures articulate the manner in which functional components are structured 
and integrated into the final product and how the components will interact and function 
(Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). In any given product market, it is possible that a number of 
different product architectures might be strategically feasible, each with different 
combinations of performance, quality or cost (Burton & Galvin, 2018; Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez, 
Galvin & Bach, 2013). For example, all electricity power generation systems will produce 
electricity, but they may be made up of a series of components that will vary significantly in 
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respect of form and function depending upon whether the generation system is based upon 
coal, gas, wind, solar or some other alternative system. Even within solar power generation 
systems as one specific choice, there will be a variety of architectures available with different 
components and the manner in which the components interface with each other. Initial 
research concerning modularity sought to understand modularity as a phenomena (e.g. 
Ullrich, 1995), the drivers of modularity (e.g. Schilling, 2000) and its impact upon a range of 
dependent variables (e.g. Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996).  More recently, how different 
architectural levels align (ie the mirroring hypothesis) and change has become a central 
theme (e.g. Burton & Galvin, 2018; Colfer & Baldwin, 2016). Building on this theme, this paper 
makes a clear contribution to our understanding concerning the dynamism of product 
architectures. This paper views product architectures from the perspective of their 
evovlability. Product architectures are rarely, if ever, stable, and we draw upon the ideas of 
synergistic specificity and complementarity1 as lenses to understand the evolution of product 
design towards and away from modular architectures, and subsequently, the extent to which 
firms use markets versus hierarchies2 for different components.  
Given the potential benefits of product modularity (greater component level learning and 
innovation, rapid determination of consumer preferences, flexibility to adapt to new 
component offerings and market demands, etc) it has been suggested that product 
architectures naturally tend towards greater levels of modularity over time (Galvin, 1999; 
Hoetker, 2006; Sanchez, 2008). Empirically this has been observed with increasing product 
modularity and industry fragmentation occurring in industries such as stereos (Langlois & 
Robertson, 1992), fanuc numeric controllers (Shibata, Kodama and Yano, 2005) motor vehicle 
production (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010) computers (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), mortgage 
banking (Jacobides, 2005) and semi-conductors (Funk, 2008). However, limitations to 
architectural or radical innovation, the ex-ante cost of designing a modular product 
 
1 The ideas of complementarity draws heavily on the work in the papers by Teece (1986) and Argyres and 
Zenger (2012) and Schilling’s (2000) work on synergistic specificity. 
2 Transaction cost economics recognises the intermediate form of networks (or alliances) as a governance 
mode between markets and hierarchies. In this paper, we tend to focus on just the binary choices of markets 
and hierarchies to keep the discussion simple. In reality, there may be a number of reasons a firm may use 
networks to source components.  For example, there may not be a sufficiently well-formed intermediate 
market or there may be some asset required that at least partially meets the criteria as a specialised asset and 
thus a fully functioning market is unlikely to exist. We do not build networks into our analysis as a separate 
governance choice as such analysis would add significantly to the complexity of the paper. 
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architecture and the challenges that come with trying to develop competitive advantage 
based around open product functionality can make an integrated architecture more attractive 
(Fixson & Park, 2008; Galvin & Rice, 2008). A limited number of scholars have examined how 
‘reintegration’ might emerge in products or industries (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; 
Christensen, Verlinden & Westerman, 2002; Fixson & Park, 2008; Galvin & Morkel, 2001; 
Jacobides & Winter, 2005). 
Despite this recognition that product architectures  evolve over time between integration and 
modularisation we have little understanding of why this may be the case other than this 
evolution occurs in “response to changes in their context, or to changes in their underlying 
components in the pursuit of better fitness” (Schilling, 2000: 314-5). To build a potential 
explanation for changes in product architectures over time, we look to the concepts of 
synergistic specificity complementarity. We follow Schilling (2000) to argue that synergistic 
specificity is the property of a system, in our case a product architecture. Schilling (2000, 316) 
highlights that synergistic specificity is defined as “The degree to which a system [emphasis 
added] achieves greater functionality by its components being specific to one another can be 
termed its synergistic specificity; the combination of components achieves synergy through 
the specificity of individual components to a particular configuration”. On the other hand, 
according to Argyres and Zenger (2012:1647-8), complementarity is grounded in the idea that 
the assets and activities of a focal firm are acquired or accessed in markets, and managers 
seek to build positions to capture value through the discovery of complementary and 
heterogeneous asset bundles. Our idea of ‘product component complementarity’ assumes 
that product components or sub-systems within a given product architecture are bundles of 
‘assets and activities’ each with its own complementary characteristics to the firm’s other 
product components (and hence ‘assets and activities’). Thus, product component 
complementarity is the characteristic of a sub-system, in our case bundles of product 
components within a given product architecture.  
 
Using these concepts,  are able to investigate the potential for firms to capture different types 
of value with different product architectures (integrated, closed modular, hybrid and open 
modular) given differing sets of transaction costs and potential for opportunistic behaviour 
from suppliers. Within the product architecture literature, value capture is often 
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conceptualised as a paradox between value capture through diffusion versus value capture 
through protection (Schilling, 1999, 2000). Schilling (2000, 329) argues that “[there is]…a 
dilemma for the firm about whether to protect or diffuse its technology: although a firm might 
wish to protect its proprietary technologies in order to appropriate rents, product systems 
based on open standards might more rapidly accumulate an installed base and be compatible 
with a wider range of complementary goods”. Similarly, West (2003) conceptualises the 
trade-off as one of adoption versus appropriation, positing that when a firm pursues a fully 
open product strategy it is likely to reduce rent appropriation as it opens up competition and 
lowers entry barriers. On the other hand, opening up a product architecture may encourage 
user adoption as it reduces consumers’ fears of being locked in to a single technology 
manufactured by a single firm. Ethiraj, Levinthal & Roy (2008) also note the duality between 
innovation and imitation and show how integrated product designs are often associated with 
imitation deterrence, whereas modular product designs are often associated with a diversity 
of ‘plug and play’ complementary product components that may serve to facilitate quicker 
and easier imitation. Kilmas & Czakon (2018) also suggest opening up a product architecture 
may encourage user adoption as it reduces consumers’ fears of being locked in to a single 
technology manufactured by a single firm. On the other hand, such an understanding provides 
managers with a better appreciation of the trade-off between the potential appropriation of 
rents versus the efficiencies that may come with access to the market (Pil & Cohen, 2006; 
Bourdeau, 2010). Assuming utility maximisation on the part of managers, such an 
understanding provides a basis for choosing alternative product architectures, and 
approaches to value capture, at different points in time. 
 
This paper is set out as follows: (i), prior modularity literature is discussed to suggest a stylised 
product architecture typology that encompasses ‘imperfect’ product architectures thereby 
extending the prior typologies developed by Shibata, Kodama and Yano, (2005) and Sanchez 
(2008) and propose a stylised product architecture typology which characterises four stylised 
product architecture types; (ii) we then explain how synergistic specifity and product 
component complementarity may propel a product architecture in either one direction or 
another on the basis ofdifferent approaches to value capture ; and, (iii) we conclude with a 
discussion of how this fits within the broader modularity research agenda and provide 
suggestions for future research. 
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PRIOR CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 
The concept of a product architecture can be traced back to Herbert Simon’s (1962) seminal 
paper ‘The Architecture of Complexity’. A product architecture is a schematic, “the scheme by 
which the function of a product is allocated to physical components” (Ulrich, 1995:419), and 
encompasses three distinct features: (i) an architecture that acts as the blueprint for the way 
in which product components are arranged; (ii) product components which contribute to the 
products’ function, and, (iii) interfaces which document how components connect together 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Product architecture has been stylised as two ideal types: integral or 
modular (Ulrich, 1995) whereby an integrated product architecture is one where product 
components, interfaces and the nature of their relationship is complex, interdependent and 
non-standardised, whereas, a modular product architecture has relationships between 
product components and interfaces that are simple, independent and standardised.  
For the purposes of this paper, we focus upon the architecture of a product component 
bundle or sub-system and use this as our unit of analysis. An entire product such as an air-
conditioning system or bicycle – to use examples of products that have previously been 
popular foci in modularity research – is likely to be made of up a series of component bundles 
or sub-systems. And in many cases, the overall product will consist of some component 
bundles or sub-systems which are modular and others that are integrated.  There are times 
in the paper where we refer to an entire product architecture to discuss how the bundles of 
components may have different architectures, but when we do this we refer to this unit of 
analysis as an entire or overall product architecture. 
 
Integrated-modular continuum 
Integrated product architectures usually incorporate product components that are tightly-
coupled and interdependent, connected together via interfaces that are closed, often 
idiosyncratic, (Sanchez, 2008) or even non-existent (Mikkola, 2003; 2006). They are often 
created to serve a single use or market purpose (Sanchez, 2008), statically-optimised along 
some dimension (Sanchez & Mahoney, 2013) such as maximum performance or the lowest 
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cost (Sanchez, 2008). Integrated product architectures are usually very difficult to re-architect 
to new uses without significant re-engineering (Sanchez & Mahoney, 2013), and hence 
product component or sub-system level innovation is often hindered, often requiring more 
difficult, expensive and time-consuming architectural innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990) 
to untangle the intricate web of interdependence and complexity. Following on, the design 
characteristics of integrated product architectures can act “as a strong force against the 
system shifting to a more modular design” (Schilling, 2000:316). 
Integrated product architectures are often designed to maximise value capture through its 
synergistic specificity (Schilling, 2000). However, an integrated product architecture, is 
potentially subject to diffusion risks arising from its non-compatibility with external 
complementary product components, and are often more expensive and time consuming to 
develop and improve than more open or modular products (Schilling, 1999). Therefore, 
Schilling (1999:269) contends that integrated product architectures often have a “high risk of 
rejection under conditions of strong network externalities” as a firm would need to generate 
its own firm-specific externalities through branding and marketing in order to generate a 
sufficient installed user base around its product architecture.  
In a modular product architecture, the design characteristic that lies at its heart is greater 
interdependence within product components than across different components (Ulrich, 
1995) permitting product components and sub-systems to be designed and produced 
independently by separate individuals, teams, divisions or firms (Sanchez, 2008), resulting in 
a reduction in development cycle time and an increase in speed to market (Sanchez & Collins, 
2001). The architectural ‘design rules’ (Clark, 1985) dictate which parameters are ‘hidden’ or 
encapsulated and which parameters are ‘visible’ to other product components. According to 
Baldwin and Clark (2000), proprietary knowledge and intellectual property rights can be 
encapsulated within the inner-workings of a product component, whereas the design rules of 
the architecture and its interface specifications remain visible to external firms and are 
widely-shared. Interface standardisation is also a key design characteristic (Sanchez, 2008), 
and can occur either within firm boundaries via the creation of firm-specific or ‘specialised 
interfaces’ (Fine, Golany & Naseraldin, 2005; Schilling, 2000), or interfaces may emerge and 
permeate across firm boundaries to eventually to become an industry-standard. Standardised 
interfaces often increase product component variety through easier substitution (Garud & 
 8 
Kumaraswamy, 1995) to give a potentially large number of product variations (Ulrich, 1995; 
Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), which may be a source of strategic advantage or option value 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Modular product architectures may, therefore, help mitigate 
transaction hazards and benefit from network externalities (Galvin & Rice, 2008; Schilling, 
1999; 2000).  
 
Closed-open continuum 
Product architectures can also be conceptualised along the dimension of being either open 
or closed (Sanchez, 2008; Shibata, et al., 2005). A closed product architecture is proprietary, 
not able to be used by other firms, and a firm may choose hide its intellectual property 
through formal mechanisms such as patents, trademarks, and copyright, or informal 
mechanisms such as secrecy, encryption, or complexity (Sanchez, et al., 2013). As a 
consequence, firms who choose to sponsor closed product architectures may be unable to 
plug and play external complementary product components from other external firms, owing 
to the specificity and idiosyncrasy of their own designs.  
Not all closed product architectures are integrated, however. Takeishi (2002) and Takeishi 
and Fujimoto (2003), for example, refer to the motor vehicle industry as a form of ‘closed 
modularisation’ and Langlois (2002) distinguishes between forms of internal modularity and 
external modularity. The idea of a closed and modular product architecture has also been 
formalised by Shibata, et al., (2005) and Sanchez (2008) in typologies and argue that they may 
offer firms the potential to respond to external demands for variety and hence capture value 
from developing internal modular product components and firm-specific interface 
specifications via their own capabilities, but it is also a decision to forego network externalities 
(Schilling, 1999), technical advances that may emerge with a diversity of contributions from 
external firms (West, 2007) and the option value of seeking the best quality or lowest cost 
product components (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). On the other hand, an open architecture has 
high levels of commonality (Sanchez, et al., 2013) and interface specifications that are 
standardised, unencumbered by intellectual property or other means of protection. Open 
product architectures are often used by many firms and are associated with the presence of 
significant network externalities and gains from trade and/or specialisation where 
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interoperability between diffuse and externally-sourced complementary product 
components is desired or essential. 
The modular-integral and open-closed continuums presented indicate a stylised 2x2 product 
architecture typology comprised of closed and integrated, closed and modular, open and 
integrated and open and modular product architecture types (as described by Sanchez, 2008; 
Shibata, et al., 2005). However, such static typologies3 seem to suffer from a weakness 
relating to the evolvability of product architectures in either direction – either towards or 
away from modularity. In practice, the terms integral and modular are relative terms, and 
many product architectures often exhibit ‘non-perfect’ characteristics, especially evident in 
the stylised types of closed and modular and hybrid product architectures. Semi-open or 
‘hybrid’ architectures have been discussed in platform literature (ie, Boudreau, 2010) but 
have received comparatively little attention in the product architecture and modularity 
literature. 
 
Hybrid product architectures 
Considering complete products, the product architectures often incorporates a blend of both 
modular and integrated product components, a blend of both specialised and industry 
standards, and ownership varies across different product component types. Hence our unit 
of analysis in the following sections is a bundle of components or sub-system within a larger 
architecture. Certainly Baldwin (2008) discusses modularity in respect of the local 
characteristics of a sub-system within a larger and often complex architecture. As such, the 
architectural characteristics of different sub-systems may vary between being modular and 
integrated across these different sub-systems within a larger product architecture. Similarly, 
Boudreau (2010) argues that product architectures, as complex and nested systems, are made 
up of multiple product components, and can often be ‘opened up’ one component at a time 
 
3 Shibata, et al., (2005:15), argue that a stylised open and integrated product architecture is very unlikely to exist 
in practical terms, because “there are virtually no products for which the mapping relationship is complex and 
for which standard interfaces have been established. Accordingly we may assume that as a rule, open 
architectures are [always] modular architectures”. For conceptual clarity, we adopt the same position in this 
paper.  
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(Boudreau, 2010). West (2003) identified two types of hybrid product strategy: (i) opening 
parts of the architecture by waiving control of the commodity layer, while retaining full 
control of other layers that may offer a source of potential differentiation along some lines; 
or (ii) disclosing technology under restrictions so it cannot be easily coped or appropriated by 
competitors. West suggests that the first strategy is likely to be advantageous to stimulate 
demand and supply side adoption and so facilitate interoperability, as, he argues, without 
some approach to innovation, differentiation or some form of lock-in, incumbent firms will 
find it very difficult to capture value unless there are significant advantages to be gained 
through marketing, customer service, or leveraging brand names. As we have argued, opening 
up a product architecture is often characterised as a crucial strategic decision because 
“opening has the potential to build momentum behind a technology, but could leave its 
creator with little control or ability to appropriate value” (Boudreau, 2010:1849). Boudreau 
(2010:1852) goes on to posit that the risks can be conceptualised as a ‘balance of power’ 
between the product architecture owner and external contracting parties. For example, if a 
firm gives up some control over a closed and integrated architecture, it can stimulate the 
intermediate market for external complementary product components and firms can benefit 
from an increase in technological diversity.  
Hybrid product architectures can, therefore, be conceptualised as a stylised product 
architecture that fosters a balance of power between the owner of the product architecture 
and external providers of complementary product components. In other words, the degree 
of hybridity a product architecture exhibits is inherently unstable and dynamic. On the one 
hand, if the product architecture owner demands increased control, or identifies 
opportunities to capture value through integrative innovation, the product architecture may 
‘close’ or become more integrated. On the other hand, increased openness may propel a 
product architecture towards an open and modular design. Boudreau (2010:1850) cites the 
example of Apple in its development of the iPhone, where Apple tightly-controlled the 
operating system, but allows thousands of external firms to develop software applications. 
The degree of hybridity is a fine balancing act, the trick being to determine which product 
components to open up and which to retain proprietary control. 
We turn now to propose a range of different product architectures that may be observed as 
products evolve and the different set of components or sub-systems vary between being 
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integrated and closed to the wider industry, through to hybrid architectures whereby some 
bundles of components are open and modular and others may be closed and modular or 
closed and integrated, and possibly product architectures being entirely open and modular.  
<<<< Insert Figure 1 about here >>>> 
In Figure 1, a closed and integrated product architecture is proprietary. It is designed and used 
by one controlling firm and a high number of product components are integrated. A low 
number of product components may be modular. The product architecture may be protected 
by either formal or informal mechanisms and interface standards are either idiosyncratic to 
the controlling firm or non-existent. 
A closed and modular product architecture is proprietary. A high number of product 
components are modular. A low number of product components are integrated. A high 
number of interface specifications have been specified by the controlling firm. A low number 
of interfaces may remain non-existent, or have been adopted as the basis of exchange with a 
low number of external suppliers. 
A hybrid product architecture has elements that are proprietary and controlled by a single 
firm, and other elements that are controlled by two or more firms. It has an intermediate mix 
of integrated product components and modular product components, and an intermediate 
mix of firm-specific and industry-wide standards. 
Finally, an open and modular product architecture does not have one controlling firm, and is 
typically non-proprietary, unencumbered by formal or informal mechanisms. A high number 
of product components are modular, interacting and connected through a high number of 
industry standards. A low number of integrated product components and firm-specific 
interfaces may be present. 
 
EVOLUTION OF PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE  
Product architectures are rarely static in nature and may often evolve in the long-run (Burton 
& Galvin, 2018; Fine, 1998; Fixson & Park, 2008; Schilling, 2000). It is often assumed that they 
evolve towards increasing openness and modularity – from left-to-right in the figure – initially 
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designed as closed and integrated, and then progressing through ‘imperfect’ periods until 
they exhibit more or less open and modular characteristics. Empirically, increasing product 
modularity and associated industry fragmentation has been noted in a number of product 
market settings from computers to motor vehicles (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010; Baldwin & Clark, 
2000). In a similar vein, the dominant logic in explaining shifts in industry architecture is 
conceptualised as a set of ‘centrifugal forces’ (Jacobides, Knusden & Augier, 2006) that push 
towards disintegration and ‘modular organisations’ whereby “the role of a tightly-integrated 
hierarchy is supplanted by loosely-coupled networks of organisational actors” (Schilling & 
Steensma, 2001:1149-1168). In other words, scholars have also argued that industry 
architecture tends to ‘mirror’ the evolvability of products towards a modular organisational 
form and disintegrated product markets populated by highly-specialised firms.  
A few scholars, however, have hinted at the possibility that product architectures may resist 
a modular design (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough & Kusunoki, 2001; Chesbrough & Prencipe, 
2008) and progress from right-to-left in the figure. Empirically, however, only a few studies 
have examined ‘reintegration’ (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; Christensen, et al., 2002; Fixson 
& Park, 2008; Jacobides & Winter, 2005). The lengthy historical review by Galvin and Morkel 
(2001) has shown how the product architecture in the bicycle industry evolved towards 
modularity, back towards integration and then back towards modularity. In explaining the 
drivers for reintegration, Christensen, et al., (2002) highlight the role of technology and 
demand-side factors, and argue that increasing integration as associated with a ‘performance 
gap’ in modular product markets.  
In their study of Shimano in the bicycle industry, Fixson and Park (2008) foreground the role 
of product designers in ‘seeking value’ [emphasis added] through reintegration. According to 
Fixson and Park (2008:1310), “knowledge across several segments appears to have been a 
necessary ingredient for maintaining competitiveness in the wake of [a] architectural shift”. 
Prior broad product component scope, they contend, helped firms avoid the modularity trap 
(Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001) and retain the knowledge required to engage in 
reintegration. In other words, a broad scope of knowledge may assist firms in identifying new 
architectural shifts and perhaps initiate a new integrated dominant design. 
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To better understand these shifts in levels of modularity in the product design, especially in 
those cases that move back towards reintegration, we draw upon ideas of synergistic 
specificity (Schilling, 2000) and complementarity developed in the work of Teece (1986) and 
latterly extended by scholars such as Jacobides, Knusden and Augier (2006), and Agyres and 
Zenger (2012). While Schilling (2000, 320) notes that synergistic specificity is a design property 
of integrated systems, Schilling does not directly discuss the transaction costs associated with 
such designs. Given that integrated product architectures are non-decomposable – at least 
unless ex-ante investments to decompose the product architecture into components and sub-
systems and define interface standards are considered valuable by the sponsoring firm –such 
designs are often enveloped within firm boundaries given the potential for ex-post 
opportunism in market exchanges. Moreover, according to Argyres and Zenger (2012:1647-
8), complementarity is grounded in the idea that the assets and activities of a focal firm are 
acquired or accessed in markets, and managers seek to build positions to capture value 
through the discovery of complementary and heterogeneous asset bundles. In addition, firm 
boundaries are then enveloped around the bundles of complementary assets that are owned. 
Furthermore, assuming markets match buyers and sellers of heterogeneous assets, the value 
assigned to assets will differ between firms to the extent that the degree of complementarity 
to the firm’s other assets differ. Put another way, the degree of complementarity is relative 
and firm-specific. Value-added, then, is the value created by the firm with the complementary 
asset included in its bundle. Using this logic, the role of strategizing managers is to identify 
“under-priced” unique complementary assets to the extent that its ‘unique’ complementarity 
is not evident to others.4 On the reverse side of the coin, should assets be or become generic 
or homogenous, and thus freely available in markets, then strategizing managers are much 
more likely to access such assets through market contracts with suppliers as the risk of ex-
post opportunism has been effectively minimised. Stated formally, Argyres and Zenger 
(2012:1649) suggest that “…firms are unlikely to integrate generically complementary assets 
and activities as well as highly capable but non-complementary assets and activities. 
 
4 Like much of the work that is considered within the field of strategic management, there is an assumption 
here that managers behave in a manner is utility maximising on the part of the firm. However, we do not 
assume true rationality as per an economic definition whereby all managers possess the same information, 
assess threats and opportunities the same or reason in the same way (Stubbart, 1989). In this respect, some 
managers will note opportunities for unique complementarity due to either their exclusive knowledge of 
internal bundles of components or their unique processing of the benefits that may accrue through externally 
available bundles of components available through the market. 
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However, firms are likely to integrate assets and activities … that are uniquely complementary 
to the other assets and activities of the firm”.  
There are some notable differences between the arguments posed by Teece (1986) and 
Argyres and Zenger (2012) relevant to this paper. Argyres and Zenger (2012:1652) note that 
Teece and TCE more generally has often concerned itself with bi-lateral market transactions, 
whereas heterogeneous and uniquely complementary asset bundles5 are concerned with 
multi-lateral exchanges, or concerns with how firms can profit from innovative activities at 
the industry architecture level.6 According to the authors, “When multiple transactions are 
interrelated and are occurring simultaneously…the holdup risk for a focal transaction 
involving a uniquely complementary capability will be considerably greater than for a single 
bi-lateral transaction” leading to the potential for opportunism in respect of one uniquely 
complementary asset to affect all assets within the bundle, further promoting vertical 
integration. By extension generic or homogenous complementary assets are much more likely 
to be characteristic of bi-lateral exchanges and, so, less likely to incur such opportunism risks.   
The modularity literature has taken up the ideas of transaction costs (ie, Baldwin, 2008; 
Sanchez, 2008;) and capabilities (ie, Aryres & Bigelow, 2010, 2006; Jacobides, 2005) to explain 
how product architectures and their associated governance modes may evolve towards 
greater openness and modularity. Complementarity, by comparison, has received little 
attention despite its promise. In the section that follows, we attempt to show how ideas of 
synergistic specificity and complementarity may be a key mechanism in the evolvability of 
product architectures and governance modes in the medium to long run.  
To develop the synthesis, we begin with two  basic assumptions, (1) synergistic specificity is a 
design property of integrated systems (product architectures), and (2) that product 
components within a given decomposed product architecture are bundles of ‘assets and 
activities’ each with its own complementary characteristics to the firm’s other product 
components (and hence ‘assets and activities’). Put simply, each product component is seen 
as emerging out of a bundle of assets and activities. Second, we assume that strategising 
managers seek to build positions to capture value either through  synergistic specificity at the 
 
5 Emphasis added 
6 Jacobides, et al., (2006) adopt an industry-level analysis of complementarity in their reinterpretation of Teece  
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product architecture level or through the discovery of uniquely complementary product 
component bundles within decomposed product architectures. Third, in the case of product 
architectures with synergistic specificity, firm boundaries are then enveloped around the 
entire product architecture, whereas for decomposed product architectures firm boundaries 
are enveloped around bundles of uniquely complementary product components that are 
owned, and market exchanges are the preferred governance mode for generic or 
homogenous complementary product components.  
 
LINKING PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE EVOLUTION AND PRODUCT COMPONENT 
COMPLEMENTARITY  
Closed and integrated architecture  
Closed and integrated product architectures are often developed in the emergent stages of a 
product market as firms experiment with idiosyncratic and unique product designs (Sanchez, 
2008). The prevailing logic is that in many new and emerging product markets, firms often 
develop “product architectures that are idiosyncratic to the firm and that feature customised 
and highly interdependent components” (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010:853). Given the ex-ante 
investments required to design and develop integrated product architectures, value capture 
from integrative innovation is a key concern for firms. Thus, if a firm can establish and protect 
its own, idiosyncratic and integrated product design as a ‘dominant design’, a firm “…may be 
able to earn near-monopoly rents” and be in “a good position to shape the evolution of the 
industry” (Schilling, 1999: 266). 
.  
TCE logic supports the rationale of enveloping entire integrated product architectures within 
firm boundaries due to significant ex-post opportunism risks associated with high levels of 
asset specificity (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Furthermore, given the high levels of synergistic 
specificity in closed and integrated product architectures, it is much more likely that any 
possible exchanges across firm boundaries would be multi-lateral, further compounding the 
risk of ex-post opportunism by the supplier.          
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Despite the potential value capture arising from synergistic specificity, , the sponsorship of 
such architectures is not without risks as product markets evolve in the medium-run (for 
instance, increased demand, emergence of a more comprehensive intermediate market, 
lower entry barriers, etc7). For example, the decision to invest in synergistic specificity is also 
a decision to forego product variety associated with product component mixing and 
matching, as well as compatibility with external complementary product components offered 
by suppliers which may lead to “…a high risk of rejection under conditions of strong network 
externalities” (Schilling, 1999:269). For example, early versions of hand-held devices were 
largely closed and integrated. The Palm hand-held device was designed and manufactured by 
Palm who sold a bundled package of hardware, operating system and applications, but it was 
later rejected by the market under conditions of strong network externality effects.  
According to Schilling (2000), drivers such as customer demands for variety and speed of 
technological change act as forces towards modularisation and less synergistic specificity, 
which compete against the higher-levels of system performance that synergistic specificity 
often enables. For Schilling (2000: 317), “the balance between the gains achievable through 
recombination and the gains achievable through specificity determines the pressure for or 
against the decomposition of the system”.  
 
Closed and modular product architecture 
Should the forces towards modularisation win out, firms may choose to invest ex-ante in 
decomposing the product architecture into components and sub-systems, and designing 
standardized interfaces that connect the various part of the product architecture together. 
This modularisation process minimizes synergistic specificity within the product architecture 
system, requiring product designers to identify particular bundles of uniquely complementary 
product components that confer a source of competitive advantage and/or differentiation 
and, hence, appropriable protective value capture. 
 
 
7 Sanchez (2008) provides an interesting discussion of the characteristics of the typical transition from 
integrated products to near-modular products. 
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At the same time, other product components within the product architecture are made much 
more generic and homogenous, and strategizing managers should be better able to gain 
access to these product components through market exchanges without the risk of ex-post 
opportunism. However, contra-dominant logic, closed and modular product components may 
be retained within vertically-integrated firm boundaries.  The prediction from the TCE 
literature is that when assets are made either non-specific or generic, the risk of ex-post 
opportunism is minimised which would normally lead to market-based contracts; in other 
words, ex-ante investments in modularisation trade-off against the risks of ex-post 
opportunism (Sanchez, Galvin & Bach, 2013). Furthermore, decomposition into product 
components eliminates interdependence with other product components, and hence market 
exchanges may revert to bi-lateral contracting arrangements, further reducing risks of ex-post 
opportunism. So, at this stage in the evolution of product architectures, why would a modular 
product architecture  be retained within firm boundaries? 
We can turn to a number of possible arguments. First, closed and modular product 
architectures offer firms the potential to respond to external demands for variety (often 
through experimentation at a component level) and hence the opportunity to capture value 
through the discovery of uniquely complementary product component bundles. Any unique 
complementarity developed through developing a variety of components is best protected 
within firm boundaries. To do otherwise runs the risk of a loss of unique complementarity and 
a transition to homogenous complementary product components designed and developed by 
suppliers. Second, valuable intellectual property relating to the inner-workings of the modular 
product component remains hidden within the boundary of the component and its interface 
standards remain firm-specific (ie, unique) to the focal firm promoting vertical integration. 
Such outcomes have been seen through the mix and match approaches that led to a variety 
of Walkman products (Sanderson & Uzumeri, 1997), Black and Decker family of power tools 
Utterback (1994) and even a range of second generation phones from Nokia and Ericsson 
(Galvin & Rice, 2008).  
The knowledge-based lens may also be instructive. Closed and modular innovation requires 
decomposition  schemes to be codified. According to Ulrich (1995), modular decomposition  
reduces cognitive complexity and it is often a gradual and recursive process (von Hippel, 
1990). Codification of decomposition  schemes – and the underlying knowledge - however, is 
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often likely to happen within firm boundaries initially, before perhaps eventually permeating 
across firm boundaries (Hoetker, 2006; Tee, 2011). Hoekter (2006), in studying the display 
screens in the computer industry, found that modularisation of components did not lead to 
task activities moving beyond firm boundaries due to communication and governance 
advantages of continuing to use internal suppliers. In essence, the modularisation of the 
product architecture may not mirror the architecture of organisational capabilities. While the 
mirroring hypothesis (Colfer & Baldwin, 2016) suggests that in time the architecture of 
organisational capabilities will align with the product architecture, the actual capacity to 
decompose architectures through codification is in itself an important capability (Jacobides, 
2006) and as such firms may be able to modularise product architectures before they develop 
the organisational capabilities around communication skills, supplier management and other 
such skills that would be required to effectively shift the procurement of components from 
internal operations to an external market.  
However, many scholars, such as Galvin & Rice (2008) Sanchez (2008), Shibata et al., (2005) 
and Tee (2011) argue that in time, the eventual emergence of intra-firm and industry 
standards for connecting modular product components makes them more homogenous and 
much more likely to move across firm boundaries. Shibata, et al., (2005), for instance, 
summise that in most cases the evolution of product architecture shifts from one of “complex, 
non-standard interfaces, through simple company-wide standard interfaces and ultimately to 
industry-wide standards” (2005:15). Many scholars have argued that once closed and 
integrated product architectures are decomposed  and interface standards developed, it is 
difficult to maintain transactions entirely within firm boundaries (ie, MacDuffie, 2013; 
Sanchez, 2008; Sanchez, et al., 2013) and the activities associated with modular product 
components may leak across firm boundaries, especially in the presence of reduced ex-post 
opportunism. Indeed, proponents of the benefits of modularity have suggested that moving 
activities across firm boundaries is associated with accessing external capabilities associated 
with technological diversity (West, 2003) and positive network externalities (Schilling, 1999; 
Sanchez, 2008).  
It is therefore probable that a closed and modular product architecture is a short-run 
phenomenon on a more general evolutionary path towards greater openness, 
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modularisation, and market-based exchanges as value capture shifts from protection to 
diffusion.   
 
Hybrid product architecture 
For closed and modular product components to move across firm boundaries, prior 
investments in ex-ante transaction costs to decompose product components and interfaces 
must have occurred, setting in motion the often-described evolutionary forces towards open 
and modular product architectures. Drawing on Argyres and Zenger (2012), for those generic 
or homogeneous complementary product components that are abundantly available in an 
intermediate market, where ex-post opportunism reduces, market-based exchanges will 
come to be the preferred governance mechanism. This modularisation process may promote 
bi-lateral dyadic exchanges between buyer and seller as transactions that may be contained 
at the product component boundary (a thin crossing point), further reducing the risk of ex-
post opportunism and supporting the operation of an open and functional market. 
Not all complementary product components, however, migrate across firm boundaries. One 
of the drawbacks to a form of modularisation that extends across firm boundaries is that “… 
firms consisting of assets that are less uniquely complementary to each other … earn average 
long-run returns at best” (Argyres & Zenger, 2012: 1648). As a response, strategizing 
managers may choose to resist the forces towards increasing openness and modularisation, 
maintaining, or creating new - perhaps through superior perception or luck - particular 
bundles of uniquely complementary product components that confer a source of competitive 
advantage and/or differentiation and, hence, appropriable value capture. For some uniquely 
complementary product components, managers with superior foresight may identify gains 
from integrated bundles, and yet, at the same time, identify gains from trade in the market 
in respect of contracting for generic or homogeneous complementary product components. 
The trick, of course, is to identify which strategy is optimal at the product component or 
‘bundle’ level of the product architecture systems hierarchy. The varied complementarity 
characteristics of product components lie at the heart of the notion of product architecture 
hybridity.     
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Extending this, generic or homogeneous complementary product components confer weak 
appropriability regimes and are much more likely migrated across firm boundaries as the risk 
of ex-post opportunism is low. On the other hand, bundles of uniquely complementary 
product components (which may consist of integrated or modular product components) are 
more likely to remain integrated within firm boundaries. In other words, the pressures for 
and against a product architecture becoming more open and modular – or remaining hybrid 
(or perhaps even reverting back towards closed and modular) – is related to the ability of 
strategizing managers to continually perceive value through bundles of uniquely 
complementary product components.  
Some other clues are available in the literature to guide firms to decide in which product 
components to promote modularisation and homogeneity, and in which components to resist 
it. For example, Baldwin and Woodward (2008) identify that many contemporary products 
are partitioned as bundles of core and peripheral product components. West (2003), on the 
other hand, suggests that control can be waived over the core commodity layer, and product 
components that confer some kind of differentiation are retained under tight control. In the 
platform literature, Boudreau (2010) argues that product architectures, as complex and 
nested systems, are made up of multiple product components, and can often be ‘opened up’ 
one component at a time (Boudreau, 2010). Boudreau (2010: 1852) also suggests that hybrid 
product architectures can vary along a number of dimensions; for example, its “…treatment 
of property rights, contracts, and rules, as well as their procedural characteristics”. These 
bundles of components that remain integrated whilst others are made modular are examples 
of unique complementarity at play, and practical examples of this can be seen in the example 
of Apple in its development of the iPhone, where Apple tightly-controlled the operating 
system, but allows thousands of external firms to develop software applications. Apple 
initially bundled Google Maps as part of its iPhone, but then replaced it with its own Apple 
Maps application as part of iPhone 5. Similarly, Netscape began life as a provider of a 
complementary product to Microsoft, who later enveloped the browser component within 
Internet Explorer (Boudreau, 2010). 
 
Open and modular product architecture 
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Sanchez, et al., (2013) suggest that a firm’s choice of product architecture and governance 
mode is likely to be associated with its ability to capture value from its product development 
activities. Within an overall product architecture that contains both integrated and modular 
bundles of components (ie a hybrid architecture), for a (mostly) open and modular product 
architecture to emerge, opportunities for value capture from gains from trade will exceed 
value capture from unique complementarity, or value capture from unique complementarity 
must be eroded – or at least not perceived by firms - and the vast majority of product 
components will be much more generic and homogenous (often leading to a level of 
commoditisation in the market). Market dynamics may offer one explanation of why hybrid 
product architectures transition towards an open and modular architecture. Langlois and 
Robertson (1995) assert that the emergence of intermediate markets for product 
components requires modes of interaction which enable newly specialised buyers and sellers 
to interact through a market interface. The emergence of standardised or industry-wide 
interfaces to connect product components together may enable further reductions in ex-post 
opportunism that make market contracts much more attractive. Thus as per the arguments 
in the previous section as to why integrated components may become modular, the unique 
complementarity that provided opportunities for added value no longer outweigh the 
benefits that may be available via gains from trade in cases featuring homogeneous 
components and limited potential for opportunism.  
Sanchez, et al., (2013) adopt a TCE perspective to make a similar argument. Where firms 
engage in an open and modular product architecture, it is likely that both ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs are reduced (Sanchez, et al., 2013) tempting new entrants to adopt the 
existing product architecture. Ultra-low8 ex-post transaction costs may be available as the 
presence of industry standards often define the parameters of bilateral exchanges between 
firms. Open and modular product architectures offer opportunities for suppliers to specialise 
in specific types of generic or homogeneous modular product components. Sanchez, et al., 
(2013) suggest that assembler firms can also benefit from both gains from specialisation and 
gains from trade via sourcing lower-cost modular product components from specialist firms 
owing to the economies of scale advantages the specialist firm has, or a firm may source 
 
8 Ultra-low transaction costs may be available due to market dynamics such as the significant presence of 
industry standards throughout the entire product architecture, as well as the intermediate market moving 
from a supplier base to a complementor base, for example. 
 22 
higher-quality product components that may earn it a price-premium for the final, assembled 
product. However, as West (2003) reminds us, without innovation, differentiation or some 
form of lock-in, it will be very difficult for assembler firms to appropriate value in the long-
run. Furthermore, it is possible that value can only be captured through retaining (or 
regaining) control of critical aspects of the architecture, such as the ownership and property 
rights of critically important product component technologies that confer some kind of 
differentiation or competitive advantage (Thomas, Autio & Gann (2014; Helm, Endres & 
Hüsig, 2017) which acts as a strong force against evolution to a fully open and modular 
product architecture.. 
 
Reintegration 
The canonical shift towards ever increasing openness and modularity is not without its limits, 
and such products are often characterised as suffering from high levels of inter-firm 
competition, commoditisation and easier imitation (ie, Ethiraj, Levinthal & Roy, 2008). 
Furthermore, the modular properties of generic and homogenous complementary product 
components may serve to constrain innovation over the medium to long-run. Innovative 
activities within an open and modular product architecture need to occur within the 
constraints of the industry standard, and so eventually the product architecture will fall away 
from an ‘efficient frontier’ of what is technologically possible (Christensen, et al., 2002). In 
response, the pressures for managers to rediscover value from investing in uniquely 
complementary product component bundles is amplified. (ie, designers seeking value through 
reintegration, see Fixson & Park, 2008). Ultimately, this type of integrative innovation may 
reverse the pendulum away from open and modular product designs and back towards at 
least some bundles of components being integrated, thereby increasing transaction costs. 
Integrative innovation may take a number of forms. For example, in line with West’s (2003) 
assertion, firms may initially focus on bundling generic or homogeneous complementary 
product components, foregrounding, via marketing or branding, product or service bundles 
that offer the opportunity for value capture. This is unlikely to generate above-average 
returns in the long-run. An alternative reintegration mechanism is to focus innovative 
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attention on investments in uniquely complementary product components, while retaining 
an outsourced relationship with suppliers.  
It is possible that firms will not have the capability to develop uniquely complementary assets 
within firm boundaries. Many scholars in the systems integration tradition have recognised 
the benefits of firms maintaining a broader knowledge than task boundary in order to capture 
value from outsourced activities. However, Argyres and Zenger (2012) note that the desire to 
possess uniquely complementary assets may be so strong that firms without at least 
comparative capabilities will still seek opportunities for value capture through acquiring and 
integrating (via acquisition) appropriate assets. In other words, even in the presence of ultra-
low transaction costs associated with open and modular product architectures, re-integration 
of uniquely complementary product components will be perceived as worth the cost, 
effectively re-introducing the hybrid characteristics of the product architecture. It is feasibly 
possible that, eventually, as bundles of uniquely complementary product components are 
acquired, invested in and re-integrated, the previously open and modular properties of the 
product architecture may be undermined to the extent that its hybridity is diluted to an extent 
whereby a closed and modular and/or closed and integrated product architecture re-emerges 
as a dominant design, perhaps serving to reignite further cyclic pressures for decomposition 
again. This process of product architecture potentially evolving towards more modular 
architectures or moving in the opposite direction through reintegration, along with the 
drivers of such evolutionary paths is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
<<<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>>> 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of this paper was twofold: (i) to outline the different forms that product architectures 
may take as these architectures evolve over time; and, (ii) to explore how the dynamic effects 
of synergistic specificity and product component complementarity may create forces that 
propel a product architecture either towards or away from increasing integration or 
modularity.  
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As previous stylised product architecture typologies tended to focus on a stylised 2x2 matrix 
(ie, Shibata, et al., 2005; Sanchez, 2008), one contribution of this paper is to argue that there 
is an evolutionary cycle that shifts product architectures towards or away from modularity 
and that often the different bundles of components that make up the overall product 
architecture may be hybrid nature. Second, these different architectures are then linked to 
the idea of synergistic specificity at the product architecture level and complementary at the 
product component level, and, hence, to its governance mode, providing a fuller picture of 
how managers, in trying to discover how to capture value typically decide to govern 
transactions in terms of the use of markets versus hierarchies. Thirdly, the evolution of 
product architecture explicitly suggests that reintegration is not only feasible, but probable 
as ever increasing product modularity may erode long-run returns to average at best. The 
evolution of different product architectures can therefore be seen as one in which product 
architectures, over the long-run, may evolve back and forth between integrated and modular 
forms, and a product architecture that makes sense in terms of value capture in one time 
period may be strategically sub-optimal in a subsequent time period.  
The second part of the paper uses the different product architectural forms as a foundation 
for exploring the extent to which synergistic specificity and product component 
complementarity are  key mechanisms in the transition between one product architecture 
type and back again. Given the premise that ownership of assets and activities is determined 
by reference to the degree of complementarity of an asset or activity to a firm’s other assets 
and activities (Argyres & Zenger, 2012), assets and activities are much more likely to be 
vertically integrated when they are uniquely complementary, owing to ex-opportunism risks 
in the intermediate market. However, exogenous factors in a typical industry life cycle 
suggests that market characteristics such as demand, entry barriers, and competitive 
intensity, for example, is likely to propel managers to perceive value capture through 
modularisation efforts. Initially, managers will strive to protect the unique characteristics of 
its synergistic specificity or unique complementarity, despite the emerging modularisation of 
the product architecture, specifying firm-specific interfaces and maintaining design and 
production in-house. However, once started, the increasing modularisation attracts new 
entrants with specialised capabilities and scale economies to intermediate markets that cause 
the unique complementarity of closed modular product components to be eroded and 
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transaction costs to fall as some bundles of product components become much more 
abundantly available, generic and homogenous.  
Hybrid product architectures emerge as managers seek to protect value in some uniquely 
complementary product component bundles that are perceived to confer a source of 
competitive advantage through integration, while for some other product components there 
are potential gains from trade in the intermediate market in respect of contracting for generic 
or homogeneous complementary product components, owing to ultra-low transaction costs 
linked to the emergence of intra-firm or industry-wide standards. In some product markets, 
hybrid architectures may be eroded to a significant extent as the emergence of industry-wide 
standards that define independent and bilateral exchanges may enable further reductions in 
ex-post opportunism that make market contracts much more attractive and as such, open 
and modular product architectures evolve.  
Without unique complementarity, generic and homogenous complementary product 
components (which are characteristic of open and modular product architectures) are 
unlikely to generate above-average returns in the long-run, as competition, commoditisation 
and imitation erode value capture. Moreover, standards constrain innovation (Galvin, 1999), 
pressurising managers to rediscover sources of value capture through investment in assets 
and activities that deliver unique complementarity. Ultimately, this type of integrative 
innovation may reverse the pendulum away from open and modular product designs and 
back towards hybrid product architectures.  
In our view, synergistic specificity and product component complementarity are  key 
mechanisms is explaining how and why product architectures transition from one design type 
to another – and back again – creating a cyclical process over the long-run. The cyclical 
characteristics of product markets have been alluded to before (Christensen, et al., 2002; 
Fine, 1998; Fixson & Park, 2008; Galvin & Morkel, 2001; Schilling, 2000; Shibata, et al., 2005) 
and evolve “in response to changes in their context, or to changes in their underlying 
components in the pursuit of better fitness” (Schilling, 200:314-5). However, exploring the 
relationship between integration-modularisation and the dynamism of capabilities and 
transaction costs – and hence complementarity – over the long-run adds a new perspective 
to prior scholarship. Thus, by drawing on Schilling (2000) and Argyres & Zenger (2012), we 
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offer a first step in offering an integrated explanation of the evolvability of product 
architectures and associated governance mode.  
From a management perspective, understanding the forces and thus the likely evolution of 
product architectures either towards or away from modular designs in critical. For example, 
early movers towards modular components may be in a position to establish the dominant 
design in select components that aligns to the firms strengths, or in open and modular 
industries that have reached a point of commoditisation of the product, those firms that make 
the early moves back towards a partially integrated architecture are likely to be rewarded 
both in terms of market positioning as well as the opportunities in reintegrate components 
of their architecture through the acquisition of firms producing the best and most 
complementary components for their operations. For example, a building firm (that uses sub-
contractors for all of its work) may seek to integrate quantity surveying into its operations as 
a point of differentiation and because of its capacity to provide a greater level of predictability 
over its cost structure. Being a first mover in this respect will (a) provide a basis for 
differentiation relative to competitors and (b) allow them to acquire the most appropriate 
quantity surveying firm in respect of complementarity. 
This paper paves the way for a number of suggestions for future research. Whilst we have 
stopped short of offering suggestions of different hybrid product architectures types, this 
work is important to aid our understanding of how hybrid product architectures evolve. We 
still know relatively little about the reasons for different forms of hybrid architectures. West’s 
(2003) assertion that firms might open parts of the architecture by waiving control of the 
commodity layer, while retaining full control of other layers is a start, however further 
research is required to understand how firms may perceive unique product component 
complementarity in terms of different architectural designs, such as core and periphery 
component structures.  
Furthermore, this paper raises important questions for proponents of the mirroring 
hypothesis (Colfer & Baldwin, 2016). Despite the call for a ‘nuanced’ view of mirroring (Colfer, 
2007), product component complementarity has not featured in this literature. Recent 
contingent contributions that examine contingencies such as product complexity and the rate 
of product component/technological change (Furlan, Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2014) have 
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been helpful in addressing the conditions under which mirroring may be challenging – or even 
ill-advised – however, the relationship between different types of product component 
complementarity and mirroring offers a new terrain for this stream of research. The link 
between different architectural levels has the potential to impact the way that organisations 
are structured, the composition of industries and even the nature of competition – issues that 
sit at the heart of strategic management research (Zubac, 2018).            
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Potential evolution of product architectures 
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Figure 2: Drivers of product architecture evolution 
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